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The Intestate Claims of Heirs Excluded by
Will: Should "Negative Wills" Be Enforced?
When a testator's will fails to provide for the disposition of his
entire estate, the portion of the estate that is not disposed of usu-
ally passes to the testator's heirs under the intestacy laws.' These
laws reflect a presumption about what the testator would have
wanted had he considered the matter.2 In some cases, however, the
testator may have expressed a contrary intent. For example, a will
may expressly disinherit an heir and leave the estate to someone
else; or it may leave a small sum "and no more" to an heir, while
giving the bulk of the estate to someone else; or a "will" may con-
tain no devise at all, but express a desire that an heir receive no
part of the estate.3 If the will does not fully dispose of the testa-
tor's property and some or all of his estate must pass by intestacy,
an issue arises as to whether the intestacy statute requires the ex-
cluded heir to receive an intestate share, contrary to the testator's
intent.
This comment discusses the circumstances in which a will that
expressly disinherits an heir or limits the heir's gift to the devise in
the will (a "negative will") may foreclose the award of an intestate
share to that heir where some or all of the testator's estate passes
by intestacy. Since the mid-nineteenth century, English courts
have enforced negative wills where (1) the testator clearly intended
to exclude an heir or to limit an heir's share in the estate to the
devise in the will, and (2) at least one other heir remains eligible to
take the property that passes by intestacy.4 Under this approach,
the exclusion of the heir (or limitation of the heir's gift) in the will
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (1983); 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE
LAW OF WILLS § 1.1, at 1-2 (rev. ed. 1960).
2 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
3 For examples of attempts to exclude an heir or limit the amount of an heir's gift, see
cases cited infra note 6. This comment will use the term "will" to include an instrument,
complying with Wills Act formalities, that purports solely to disinherit or limit an heir with-
out making an affirmative distribution of any property, although such an instrument may
not be considered testamentary under current law, see, e.g., 4 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra
note 1, § 30.17, at 115-16. The word "testator" will be used to refer to the maker of such an
instrument.
4 See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text; see also infra note 23 (discussing re-
quirement that at least one heir remain eligible to take).
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is treated as an implied gift of that heir's share under the intestacy
statute to the testator's other heirs.5 Nearly all American courts,
however, have held that the heir is entitled to his intestate share
despite the testator's expression of a contrary intent.6 New York7
and Louisianas are the only American jurisdictions that recognize
the validity of negative wills.
Part I of this comment examines the treatment of negative
wills in American and English courts. Part II shows that the
"American rule" is unsatisfactory because it furthers no important
policy underlying the law of wills and because it unnecessarily
frustrates the testator's intent. Part III shows that it is proper to
apply the implied-gift doctrine to negative wills when a testator
expresses a clear intent to exclude an heir or limit the heir's gift to
See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Quattlebaum v. Simmons Nat'l Bank, 208 Ark. 66, 70, 184 S.W.2d 911, 913
(1945); Estate of Lefranc, 38 Cal. 2d 289, 295, 239 P.2d 617, 621 (1952); In re Estate of Levy,
196 So. 2d 225, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); In re Estate of Cancik, 121 Ill. App. 3d 113,
116-17, 459 N.E.2d 296, 299 (1984); In re Estate of Eason, 238 Iowa 98, 101, 26 N.W.2d 103,
105 (1947); In re Estate of Stroble, 6 Kan. App. 2d 955, 962, 636 P.2d 236, 242 (1981);
Loring v. Dexter, 256 Mass. 273, 280, 152 N.E. 356, 358-59 (1926); In re Estate of Beier, 205
Minn. 43, 51-52, 284 N.W. 833, 837-38 (1939); In re Estate of Smith, 353 S.W.2d 721, 723-24
(Mo. 1962); In re Estate of Stewart, 113 N.H. 179, 180, 304 A.2d 361, 362 (1973); Lawes v.
Lynch, 7 N.J. Super. 584, 590-91, 72 A.2d 414, 418, aff'd, 6 N.J. 1, 76 A.2d 885 (1950); Crane
v. Executors of Doty, 1 Ohio St. 279, 282-84 (1853); Ritter Estate, 81 Pa. D. & C. 498, 500
(Orph. Ct. 1952); Caramatro v. Caramatro, 78 R.I. 402, 407-08, 82 A.2d 849, 851 (1951);
Blackman v. Gordon, 19 S.C.,Eq. (2 Rich Eq.) 43, 45 (1845); Condry v. Coffey, 163 Tenn.
508, 513, 43 S.W.2d 928, 930 (1931); Najvar v. Vasek, 564 S.W.2d 202, 207 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978); Coffman v. Coffman, 85 Va. 459, 460-61, 8 S.E. 672, 672 (1888); Estate of Connolly, 65
Wis. 2d 440, 446-52, 222 N.W.2d 885, 888-91 (1974); see also THOMAS ATKINSON, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 36, at 145 (2d ed. 1953); 4 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 1,
30.17.
The supreme courts of Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, and North Carolina at one time
followed the English rule. See Tabor v. McIntire, 79 Ky. 505, 507 (1881); LaMere v. Jackson,
288 Mich. 99, 103-04, 284 N.W. 659, 661 (1939); Blochowitz v. Blochowitz, 130 Neb. 789, 805,
266 N.W. 644, 652 (1936); Doe ex rel. Hoyle v. Stowe, 13 N.C. 200, 204 (1830). These states,
however, have since adopted the approach followed by a majority of American courts. See
Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 706-10, 60 S.W. 639, 640-41 (1901); In re Estate of Brown, 362
Mich. 47, 51-52, 106 N.W.2d 535, 537 (1960); In re Estate of Swanson, 179 Neb. 834, 837-38,
140 N.W.2d 665, 667 (1966); Ford v. Whedbee, 21 N.C. 21, 25 (1834).
Although New York courts initially adopted the American rule, see, e.g., In re Will of
Trumble, 199 N.Y. 454, 465-66, 92 N.E. 1073, 1076 (1910), the New York Wills Act was
amended in 1967 to provide that a will may either dispose of property "or direct[] how it
shall not be disposed of," N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.18 (McKinney 1981). This
statute has been interpreted as authorizing the enforcement of negative wills. See In re Will
of Stoffel, 104 Misc. 2d 154, 155-56, 427 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (Sur. Ct.) (enforcing negative will
and interpreting statute as abrogating American rule), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 658, 437 N.Y.S.2d
922 (1980); In re Will of Beu, 70 Misc. 2d 396, 398, 333 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859-60 (Sur. Ct. 1972)
(same), aff'd, 44 A.D.2d 774, 354 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1974).
8 See Succession of Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1036, 1049, 20 So. 193, 198 (1896).
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the devise contained in the will. Under this approach, the excluded
heir is treated as if he had predeceased the testator, and his share
of the intestate portion of the estate is divided among the testa-
tor's remaining heirs.
I. COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF NEGATIVE WILLS
A. The English Rule
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English
courts disagreed about whether a negative will could foreclose the
award of an intestate share to an excluded heir. In 1706, the House
of Lords held in Vachell v. Breton9 that a devise of "10 shillings,
and no more" to the decedent's children barred them from receiv-
ing an intestate share of the estate.1" Although the reporter did not
provide the court's rationale for this conclusion, the court may
have adopted the appellants' argument that granting an intestate
share to the testator's children would in effect "mak[e] a new will
for him" because he had intended the children to receive only the
devise contained in his will."
Most English courts, however, initially avoided the application
of the rule in VachellJ 2 and instead held that a negative will could
not prevent an heir from receiving his share of any property that
passed by intestacy.' s Two justifications were offered for this re-
sult. First, negative wills were considered to be invalid because,
under the law of succession, only an affirmative disposition of the
decedent's property could prevent an heir from receiving his intes-
9 5 Bro. P.C. 51, 2 Eng. Rep. 527 (H.L. 1706).
10 Id. at 52-54, 2 Eng. Rep. at 528-29 (emphasis in original).
11 Id. at 53, 2 Eng. Rep. at 528 (argument of counsel for appellants).
12 Rather than expressly contradict the holding in Vachell, some courts distinguished it
on various factual grounds. See, e.g., Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. 492, 493, 30 Eng. Rep.
1121, 1122 (Ch. 1797) (distinguishing Vachell on the grounds that the heirs in Vachell were
illegitimate children and that the property passed first to the testator's executors as fiduci-
aries and then to heirs in a resulting trust, giving greater discretion to the court); cf. Lett v.
Randall, 3 Sm. & G. 83, 88, 107 Rev. Rep. 26, 29 (Ch. 1855) (enforcing negative will but
distinguishing between cases such as Vachell where the will on its face did not dispose of all
the estate and cases where a devise lapsed after the execution of the will). Most courts,
however, gave no specific reason for declining to follow Vachell. See, e.g., Sympson v. Horn-
sby, Prec. Ch. 452, 453, 24 Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03 (Ch. 1716) (asserting that Vachell was
"nothing like the present case"); Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Beav. 318, 318-19, 49 Eng. Rep. 361,
362 (M.R. 1841) (refusing to enforce a negative will but not discussing Vachell).
13 See, e.g., Denn v. Gaskin, 2 Cowp. 657, 660-61, 98 Eng. Rep. 1292, 1294 (K.B. 1777);
Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. 492, 493, 30 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1122 (Ch. 1797); Cresswell v.
Cheslyn, 2 Eden 123, 125, 28 Eng. Rep. 843, 844 (Ch. 1762), aff'd, 3 Bro. P.C. 246 (H.L.
1763); Sympson v. Hornsby, Prec. Ch. 452, 453, 24 Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03 (Ch. 1716); John-
son v. Johnson, 4 Beav. 318, 318-19, 49 Eng. Rep. 361, 362 (M.R. 1841).
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tate share.14 In addition, negative wills were thought to amount to
an impermissible attempt to alter the distribution scheme pro-
vided in the intestacy statute."
Despite the initial disagreement, English courts reached a con-
sensus by the mid-nineteenth century that negative wills were en-
forceable if two conditions were met:' 6 the testator clearly ex-
pressed an intent to limit an heir to the devise (if any) contained
in the will, and at least one other heir remained eligible to receive
the intestate property. 7 This result was achieved through the ap-
plication of the implied-gift doctrine:'8 the negative will vas inter-
preted as a gift of the excluded heir's portion of the intestate prop-
erty to the testator's other heirs.19
B. The American Rule
Beginning with Jackson ex rel. Bogert v. Schauber ° in 1827,
most American courts have rejected the modern English rule, 2'
holding instead that a testator may prevent an heir from receiving
his share of any property that passes by intestacy only by affirma-
tively disposing of the entire estate through a will. 22 Three princi-
" See, e.g., Denn v. Gaskin, 2 Cowp. 657, 660-61, 98 Eng. Rep. 1292, 1294 (K.B. 1777);
Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. 492, 493, 30 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1122 (Ch. 1797).
" See Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. 492, 494, 30 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1122 (Ch. 1797).
Is These courts did not overrule the earlier decisions but simply adopted narrow con-
structions of those decisions. See In re Wynn, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 237, 240-41 (Ch. 1983) (dis-
cussing the development of the current English rule).
7 See, e.g., In re Wynn, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 237, 241 (Ch. 1983); Lett v. Randall, 3 Sm. &
G. 83, 89-90, 107 Rev. Rep. 26, 30-31 (Ch. 1855); Bund v. Green, 12 Ch. D. 819, 821-22
(1879).
18 For a discussion of the implied-gift doctrine, see infra notes 56-82 and accompanying
text.
I See, e.g., In re Wynn, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 237, 241 (Ch. 1983); Lett v. Randall, 3 Sm. &
G. 83, 89-90, 107 Rev. Rep. 26, 31 (Ch. 1855).
20 7 Cow. 186, 194-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Wend. 15 (N.Y.
1828). In 1967, New York adopted a variation of the English rule by statute. See supra note
7.
21 Many early American decisions relied principally on English cases that had refused
to enforce negative wills. See, e.g., Jackson ex rel. Bogert v. Schauber, 7 Cow. 186, 195 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1827) (relying on Denn v. Gaskin, 2 Cowp. 657, 98 Eng. Rep. 1292 (K.B. 1777), to
invalidate negative will), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Wend. 15 (N.Y. 1828); Boisseau v. Al-
dridges, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 240, 258-61 (1834) (Brooke, J.) (same). The fact that the English
courts have since reexamined and reversed their position on the validity of negative wills,
see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text, undercuts the precedential effect of these
early American decisions and suggests that American courts should also reexamine their
approach.
2 See, e.g., In re Estate of Cancik, 121 Ill. App. 3d 113, 116, 459 N.E.2d 296, 299 (1984)
("The only means by which a testator can disinherit an heir is to give the property to some-
one else . . . .") (citation omitted); In re Estate of Stroble, 6 Kan. App. 2d 955, 962, 636
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pal rationales have been offered for this approach.2 3 First, some
courts have reasoned that negative wills violate the intestacy stat-
ute,24 which governs the distribution of property not disposed of
by will, because they alter the distribution scheme provided in the
statute without affirmatively disposing of the estate.2 5 Second, neg-
P.2d 236, 242 (1981) (similar); see also cases cited supra note 6.
23 In addition to the three rationales discussed in text, two other justifications have
been offered for the American rule. First, some courts have reasoned that a negative will is
not enforceable because it is not testamentary. See, e.g., In re Hefner's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d
252, 253 (Sur. Ct. 1953). This argument, however, is circular: something is "testamentary" if
it is properly done by will. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1322 (5th ed. 1979) (defining
"testamentary" as "pertaining to a will"); 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 1, § 1.3, at 6
(equating a "will" with a "testamentary disposition"). Moreover, even if the term "testa-
mentary" applied only to an affirmative disposition of property, a negative will could be
considered testamentary under the English rule because it does actually dispose of property:
the exclusion of an heir in a will constitutes an implied gift of his intestate share to the
testator's other heirs. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
Second, at least one court has suggested that a negative will that excluded all of the
testator's heirs would effectively nullify the intestacy statute, and a court would not be able
to determine who should receive the property. See Andrews v. Harron, 59 Kan. 771, 51 P.
885 (1898). This rationale, however, does not justify a blanket prohibition of negative wills.
In the rare situation where all of the testator's heirs have been excluded, the property could
escheat to the state as provided in the intestacy statute. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
105 (1983) ("If there is no taker under the [intestacy statute], the intestate estate passes to
the [state]."). Alternatively, the prohibition on negative wills could simply be limited to
such rare situations. See, e.g., In re Wynn, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 237, 240 (Ch. 1983) (" '[A] decla-
ration that none of his next of kin shall take any part of his personal estate, nor his heir-at-
law any part of his real estate, can never operate by implication so as to give the Crown a
right to the real or personal estate.' ") (quoting Lett v. Randall, 3 Sm. & G. 83, 89, 107 Rev.
Rep. 26, 30-31 (Ch. 1855)); see also 41 CALIF. L. REV. 758, 760 (1953) (supporting use of
implied-gift doctrine only if an heir remains eligible to take).
Although no court has expressly adopted a family-protection rationale, negative wills
might also be prohibited where it is thought necessary to protect a testator's close relatives
from disinheritance. See M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES
117-20 (1971); see also Southgate v. Karp, 154 Mich. 697, 701, 118 N.W. 600, 602 (1908)
(refusing to enforce negative will and noting the presumption against disinheritance of
heirs). The American rule is an unsatisfactory method of achieving family protection, how-
ever, because a testator can still disinherit needy relatives by disposing of the entire estate
in his will. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. To the extent that family protection
is necessary, see infra note 35, it is best achieved by other mechanisms such as elective
share and homestead provisions. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201 (1983) (elective
share); id. § 2-401 (homestead allowance).
U See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, § 2-1 (1983) (intestate property "shall be distrib-
uted" as provided in statute); NEv. REV. STAT. § 134.030 (1979). (intestate property "de-
scends and must be distributed" as provided in statute); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (1983)
(property "not effectively disposed of" by will passes to decedent's statutory heirs).
"' See, e.g., In re Estate of Barker, 448 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (testator
can disinherit an heir only" 'by making a testamentary disposition of the property inconsis-
tent with the normal course of descent' ") (quoting Annot., 100 A.L.R.2D 325, 327-28 (1965));
Lawes v. Lynch, 7 N.J. Super. 584, 590, 72 A.2d 414, 418 (decedent can exclude an heir only
"by effectively devising and bequeathing his property to others" because "[i]t is the law, not
the testator, that confers the right of succession and determines who shall take the property
The University of Chicago Law Review [52:177
ative wills have been prohibited on the ground that their enforce-
ment would "mix" the probate and intestacy systems: a decedent's
property "must go by devise or descent; and in either mode it goes
entirely uncontrolled by the other; and it is impossible to conceive
of an estate created by a mixture of the two."26 Third, some courts
have suggested that negative wills are invalid because their en-
forcement would require "judicial will drafting": the court would
have to determine who should receive the excluded heir's intestate
share without any guidance from the testator's will. 27
A few American courts, however, have adopted the English
rule,28 employing a rationale similar to that in Vachell:29 where a
testator clearly intended to exclude an heir, the courts should give
effect to that intention. ° In addition, these courts have reasoned
that, because the intestacy statute is intended to apply only where
the testator has not expressed a more specific intent in a will, 1 the
statute should not be used to defeat the testator's express inten-
of which a decedent is intestate"), aff'd, 6 N.J. 1, 76 A.2d 885 (1950); Huffman v. Huffman,
329 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (testator "must make a disposition in favor of
another" in order to disinherit an heir because "the law provides how a man's estate shall go
at his death unless he by his will plainly directs that it shall go differently"), a/I'd, 161 Tex.
267, 339 S.W.2d 885 (1960).
26 Crane v. Executors of Doty, 1 Ohio St. 279, 283 (1853); see also, e.g., Ritter Estate, 81
Pa. D. & C. 498, 501 (Orph. Ct. 1952) (a negative will cannot deprive an heir of his intestate
share because a decedent "'must be one of two things-a dead man with a will, or a dead
man without one, not a sort of posthumous entity' ") (quoting Wharton, Lien of Decedents'
Debts in Pennsylvania, 6 Weekly Notes of Cases 545, 545 (1879)).
27 Estate of Connolly, 65 Wis. 2d 440, 449, 222 N.W.2d 885, 889 (1974); see also, e.g.,
Williams v. Norton, 126 Ark. 503, 511, 191 S.W. 34, 37 (1917) (negative wills are prohibited
because "courts cannot make wills for parties").
28 See Tabor v. McIntire, 79 Ky. 505, 507 (1881), overruled, Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky.
704, 710, 60 S.W. 639, 641 (1901); Succession of Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1036, 1049, 20 So. 193,
198 (1896); LaMere v. Jackson, 288 Mich. 99, 103-04, 284 N.W. 659, 661 (1939), overruled,
In re Estate of Brown, 362 Mich. 47, 51-52, 106 N.W.2d 535, 537 (1960); Blochowitz v.
Blochowitz, 130 Neb. 789, 805, 266 N.W. 644, 652 (1936), overruled, In re Estate of Swan-
son, 179 Neb. 834, 837-38, 140 N.W.2d 665, 667 (1966); In re Will of Beu, 70 Misc. 2d 396,
398, 333 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859-60 (Sur. Ct. 1972) (construing N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW
§ 1-2.18 (McKinney 1981) as having abrogated the American rule), a/I'd, 44 A.D.2d 774, 354
N.Y.S.2d 600 (1974); Doe ex rel. Hoyle v. Stowe, 13 N.C. 200, 204 (1830), overruled by
implication, Ford v. Whedbee, 21 N.C. 21, 25 (1834).
'9 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
30 See, e.g., Tabor v. McIntire, 79 Ky. 505, 507 (1881) (where will excluded the dece-
dent's nephew, "there can be no doubt that the totally excluded nephew can take nothing
under the laws of descent" because the decedent "had the right to dispose of her property as
she wished"), overruled, Todd v. Gentry, 109 Ky. 704, 710, 60 S.W. 639, 641 (1901);
Blochowitz v. Blochowitz, 130 Neb. 789, 805, 266 N.W. 644, 652 (1936) (exclusion of the
testator's sons in his will "clearly express[es] [his] intent ... which it is the duty of this
court to carry into effect"), overruled, In re Estate of Swanson, 179 Neb. 834, 837-38, 140
N.W.2d 665, 667 (1966).
31 See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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tion 3 2 Following the English approach, these courts have con-
cluded that the exclusion of an heir in a negative will constitutes
an implied gift to the testator's other heirs.3 At present, only two
American jurisdictions permit a negative will to foreclose the
award of an intestate share to an excluded heir.34
II. THE INADEQUACY OF THE AMERICAN RULE
The principle of testamentary freedom is the cornerstone of
the Anglo-American law of succession, 35 and the underlying pur-
32 See, e.g., In re Estate of Weissmann, 137 Misc. 113, 116-17, 243 N.Y.S. 127, 131-32
(Sur. Ct. 1930) (criticizing the American rule but concluding that precedent required that
the rule be followed), aff'd, 232 A.D. 698, 247 N.Y.S. 901 (1931).
3 See, e.g., Tabor v. McIntire, 79 Ky. 505, 507 (1881), overruled, Todd v. Gentry, 109
Ky. 704, 710, 60 S.W. 639, 641 (1901); In re Will of Beu, 70 Misc. 2d 396, 398, 333 N.Y.S.2d
858, 859-60 (Sur. Ct. 1972) (construing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.18 (McKin-
ney 1981) to require the award of the excluded heir's intestate share to the testator's other
heirs), aff'd, 44 A.D.2d 774, 354 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1974); see also Boisseau v. Aldridges, 32 Va.
(5 Leigh) 240, 263-71 (1834) (Tucker, P., dissenting) (arguing that a negative will can consti-
tute a gift by implication of the excluded heir's intestate share to the testator's other heirs);
Estate of Connolly, 65 Wis. 2d 440, 461-68, 222 N.W.2d 885, 896-99 (1974) (Hansen, J.,
dissenting) (same). Most American courts, however, have held that a negative will does not
create an implied gift to the testator's other heirs. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
34 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 319, 324, 333 (a "high value" is placed on testamentary freedom in the United States);
Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 489, 491, 499 (1975)
(characterizing the power of testation as the "first principle" and the "preeminent value" of
the law of wills); Touster, Testamentary Freedom and Social Control-After-Born Chil-
dren (pt. 1), 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 251, 255 (1957) (describing the principle of testamentary
freedom as not only "a natural almost political right, but a natural condition of all law as
well"). Several different rationales have been offered to justify the principle of testamentary
freedom:
[The power of testation] has been said to be a necessary complement of the immortal-
ity of the soul, a stimulus to increased productive or acquisitive activity, a means of
maintaining family discipline, and a postulate necessarily flowing from the democratic
principle of freedom. Freedom of testation, as an alternative to the fixed, unbending
rules of intestacy, permits a property owner flexibility in considering and weighing the
individual needs and deserts of the various members of his family as well as of other
persons and institutions that may be dependent upon him.
M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra note 23, at 8; see also Haskell, The Power of Disinher-
itance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEo. L.J. 499, 500-01 (1964). Giving testators the power to
devise their property to whomever they wish obviously creates the possibility that they will
use this power for arbitrary or spiteful purposes. See, e.g., M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON,
supra note 23, at 55 ("The price society has to pay for giving such power to individuals is its
potential for abuse for arbitrary, whimsical or even spiteful ends."). The danger of abuse has
prompted some commentators to propose additional restrictions upon testamentary free-
dom. See, e.g., Haskell, supra, at 518-26 (proposing forced share for children and provision
for needy parents). But the recent relaxation of restrictions upon testamentary freedom, see,
e.g., J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 842-62 (3d ed. 1984) (dis-
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pose of the law of wills is to implement the testator's intent.3" Nev-
ertheless, it is proper to restrict testamentary freedom where it
conflicts with an overriding public policy, such as family protection
or the prevention of "dead hand" control of property.37 Unless the
enforcement of the testator's intent expressed in a negative will
would undermine either the principle of testamentary freedom or
conflict with some overriding public policy, there can be no justifi-
cation for the approach taken by a majority of American courts.
A. Frustration of the Testator's Intent
The American rule defeats the testator's intention, expressed
in a valid will, to exclude an heir. A typical example would occur
where a childless testator provides in his will that his sister is to be
"deprived of any interest whatsoever" in his estate and that his
uncle is to receive the entire estate. If the testator's uncle prede-
ceases him, the devise to the uncle lapses, 3 and the estate will pass
by intestacy; if the testator's sister is his heir under the intestacy
statute, the American rule requires the award of an intestate share
to the sister, even though the testator expressly denied her any
part of his estate. In fact, while we can only guess how the testator
would have wanted his property to be distributed if it could not go
to his uncle, we can be certain of one thing-he did not want any
of his estate to go to his sister.
The application of the intestacy statute in this situation is also
inconsistent With the basic purpose of that statute. The intestacy
cussing various proposals to reform the rule against perpetuities, which defeats a testator's
intent in order to promote the alienability of property); R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0.
BROWDER, PALMER'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 123-25 (4th ed. 1983)
(mortmain statutes designed to prevent the disinheritance of close relatives in favor of char-
ities have been repealed in nearly every state), widespread support for testamentary free-
dom, see, e.g., Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra, at 336 (89% of those surveyed believed that
there should be no restrictions on the power of testation), and the fact that this power is
rarely abused, see, e.g., Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property,
Succession and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 340, 364, suggest that additional limitations
should not be placed on the power of testation.
"' See, e.g., Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake:
Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 521, 529 (1982) (the "basic goal"
of the Wills Act is to effectuate the testator's intent).
"' Examples of restrictions on the power of testation include taxation, forced-share or
other family-protection legislation, the rule against perpetuities, and various rules against
using wills to accomplish illegal purposes. See generally M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON,
supra note 23, at 55-133; Friedman, supra note 35, at 355-65.
38 In the absence of an applicable anti-lapse statute or a residuary clause in the will, a
devise to a person who predeceases the testator lapses and that property will pass by intes-
tacy. See, e.g., 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 1, § 30.15, at 110; J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, supra note 35, at 354-55.
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system is designed to implement the testator's probable intent in
the absence of a will. 9 Where a testator has made a negative will,
however, it is anomalous to frustrate his actual intent by mechani-
cally following the statutory scheme of intestacy: the testator's own
will shows that he preferred his own plan of distribution to that
provided by the intestacy statute.40
This inconsistency with the principle of testamentary freedom
has caused a further problem under the American rule: courts
often adopt strained "constructions" of wills in order to circum-
vent the prohibition on negative wills. 41 In In re Estate of Weiss-
mann,42 for example, the testator, Caesar Weissmann, provided
that his property was to pass to the "Estate of Caesar Weiss-
mann," and stated that his niece Adelaide was to take nothing.43
Since a devise to the testator's "estate" is usually interpreted as a
devise to those who would be his heirs under the intestacy stat-
ute,44 the application of the American rule should have resulted in
Weissmann's heirs (including his niece Adelaide) receiving his
property. In order to give effect to the testator's intent, however,
the court interpreted "Estate of Caesar Weissmann" to mean all of
Weissmann's heirs except Adelaide. Thus, the court was able to
hold that none of his estate passed by intestacy.45
The use of the "construction" rubric in negative will cases is a
highly unsatisfactory method of mitigating the harsh results pro-
duced by the American rule. Because there can be no principled
11 See, e.g., Trust Co. Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 Ga. 222, 223-24, 271 S.E.2d 141,
143 (1980); Green v. Woodward, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 105-06, 318 N.E.2d 397, 401 (1974);
see also Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 35, at 324 (intestacy statutes should deviate from
"the preferred distributive pattern of intestate decedents. . . only if necessary to satisfy an
overriding societal interest"). But see Kossow, The New York Law of Intestate Succession
Compared with the Uniform Probate Code: Where There's No Will There's a Way, 4 ForD-
HAM URB. L.J. 233, 238-39 (1976) (suggesting that intestacy statutes should promote societal
goals rather than the testator's presumed intent).
40 Cf. Langbein, supra note 35, at 499 (testators draft wills because they desire their
own plan of distribution).
41 See, e.g., Estate of Lefranc, 38 Cal. 2d 289, 295-302, 239 P.2d 617, 620-25 (1952) (to
avoid award of the residue of the estate to heir excluded by no-contest clause, court inter-
preted testamentary trust to remain in effect until that heir's death); Strauss v. Strauss, 363
Ill. 442, 447-52, 2 N.E.2d 699, 702-04 (1936) (construing residuary clause to create a class
gift in order to prevent an excluded heir from receiving his intestate share of a lapsed
devise).
41 137 Misc. 113, 243 N.Y.S. 127 (Sur. Ct. 1930), af'd, 232 A.D. 698, 247 N.Y.S. 901
(1931).
43 Id. at 114-15, 243 N.Y.S. at 130.
"4 See, e.g., id. at 118-19, 243 N.Y.S. at 133-34; 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 1,
§ 34.35.
" Estate of Weissmann, 137 Misc. at 117-19, 243 N.Y.S. at 133-35.
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method for determining when a negative will should be "con-
strued" to avoid frustrating the testator's intent,46 the use of
strained constructions imposes costs on the probate system. It cre-
ates uncertainty for all parties because they cannot easily predict
when a court will strictly apply the American rule and when that
rule will be circumvented. This uncertainty increases litigation be-
cause both the party contesting the will and the proponent of the
will have incentives to litigate: each can argue that his case is dis-
tinguishable from prior cases.47
B. Justifications for the American Rule
Courts that refuse to enforce negative wills offer three princi-
pal justifications for this limitation on testamentary freedom: (1)
negative wills would create an undesirable "mixing" of the probate
and intestacy systems by requiring courts to alter the distribution
scheme provided in the intestacy statute;" (2) because negative
wills do not expressly indicate who should receive the excluded
heir's share of the property that passes by intestacy, their enforce-
ment would in effect require courts to draft new wills for testa-
tors;49 and (3) negative wills are inconsistent with the law of suc-
cession, which generally provides that property not disposed of by
the will shall descend as provided in the intestacy statute. 50 None
of these rationales, however, withstands analysis.
The first argument-that a decedent's property must pass ei-
ther by devise or by intestacy but not by a "mixture" of the two
systems-simply states a conclusion: no court has explained why it
would be undesirable to "mix" the probate and intestacy systems.
In fact, courts routinely permit such "mixing" in cases of partial
testacy: where a will disposes of only part of a testator's estate, the
rest of his property passes to his heirs under the intestacy stat-
ute.51 For example, a testator may have devised one-half of his
4 Cf. Langbein, supra note 35, at 525 (arguing that the rule of strict compliance with
Wills Act formalities has produced "results so harsh" that courts have developed "a vast,
contradictory, unpredictable and sometimes dishonest caselaw" in order to avoid frustrating
testators' intent).
47 Cf. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 36, at 566 (courts' use of the "construction"
rubric in recent mistake decisions permits "litigants defending future claims based upon
[those decisions to] object that these were mistake cases in disguise, wrongly decided on
account of the failure of the deciding courts to recognize that the no-reformation rule ob-
tains its force from the Wills Act").
48 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
4' See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
:0 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
5' See, e.g., In re Estate of Barker, 448 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("Noth-
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property to his niece and one-half to his aunt. If his aunt prede-
ceases him and his will does not contain a residuary clause, his
niece will receive one-half of the estate under the will, and the
other half will pass by intestacy.2
In situations analogous to negative wills, moreover, "mixing"
the probate and intestacy systems is not controversial. For exam-
ple, courts have little difficulty enforcing a provision in a will that
property is to be distributed according to the intestacy statute."
Courts will even implement a provision in a will that the testator's
property is to be distributed according to the intestacy statute ex-
cept as modified in one or more respects.5 4 Such provisions differ
from negative wills in only one way: they incorporate the intestacy
statute expressly, while negative wills incorporate the statute im-
plicitly.5 5 In either case, a court must enforce a will by examining
both the will and the intestacy statute in order to determine how
the estate should be distributed. Yet the American rule leads to
the anomalous result that courts enforce the express incorporation
of the intestacy statute while prohibiting the implied incorpora-
tion.
The second and third justifications for the American rule-
that enforcing a negative will would require a court to make a new
will for the testator and that the exclusion of an heir does not af-
firmatively dispose of the testator's property as required by the
law of succession-rest on the assumption that the mere exclusion
of an heir in the will provides a court with no guidance in deter-
mining how to distribute the intestate share. This assumption is
unjustified, however, because, as will be shown below, the exclusion
of an heir in a negative will necessarily constitutes an implied gift
of the intestate share to the testator's remaining heirs.
ing in the law precludes a testator from disposing of only a portion of his estate by will and
allowing the balance to be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.") (cita-
tions omitted); 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 1, § 30.15, at 107-10 (discussing partial-
testacy cases).
51 See supra note 38.
" See, e.g., In re Estate of Smith, 16 Del. Ch. 272, 278, 145 A. 671, 674 (1929); Ulman v.
Estate of Bock, 85 S.D. 113, 117, 177 N.W.2d 734, 736 (1970); see also T. ATKINSON, supra
note 6, § 80, at 392 n.49 ("It would be unthinkable to refuse to recognize the [intestacy]
statute as a permissible source of reference.").
" See, e.g., Estate of McGovran, 190 Pa. 375, 380, 42 A. 705, 705-06 (1899) (per
curiam).
16 See infra notes 65-67, 76 and accompanying text.
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III. THE IMPLIED-GIFT DOCTRINE AND NEGATIVE WILLS
Courts in England56 enforce negative wills on the theory that a
negative will creates an implied gift of the excluded heir's intestate
share to the testator's other heirs.57 Most American courts, how-
ever, have refused to apply the implied-gift doctrine to negative
wills on the ground that the testator's intent is ambiguous: he may
have wanted the excluded heir to receive only the devise (if any) in
his will, or he may simply have intended to express a preference
for other beneficiaries of his will over the excluded heir.58 This rea-
soning is flawed because it conflates two distinct issues: whether a
testator intended to limit an heir strictly to the devise (if any) in
the will, and whether a testator who intended his heir to receive
only what was devised in the will would have wanted the property
that passes by intestacy to go to the remaining heirs. In fact, the
testator's intent to exclude an heir will be quite clear in many neg-
ative will situations. Rather than presuming that the testator's in-
tent is ambiguous, the courts should first examine the will to deter-
mine if his intent is actually ambiguous. The objections raised by
these courts can be satisfied if the implied-gift doctrine is applied
only where the testator's intent to exclude an heir is clear, not
where it is ambiguous.59
The implied-gift doctrine has been applied in a wide variety of
cases to fill gaps in testamentary schemes,60 especially where a will
fails to provide a gift over following a life estate. For example,
where T devises "Blackacre to A for life, and if A dies without
children, remainder to B," it is not clear what T intended in the
event that A should die with children. T may have intended to
retain a reversionary interest, or he may have wanted A's children
56 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
11 Some American jurisdictions also, at one time, enforced negative wills on this theory.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., In re Estate of Hittel, 141 Cal. 432, 436-37, 75 P. 53, 54 (1903); In re Estate
of Brown, 362 Mich. 47, 52, 106 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (1960).
"I For examples of cases in which the testator's intent to exclude an heir is ambiguous,
see In re Estate of Barker, 448 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (devise of one dollar
each to four heirs did not establish that the testator intended to exclude these heirs); Loring
v. Dexter, 256 Mass. 273, 276-78, 152 N.E. 356, 357-58 (1926) (provision in will that heirs
were disinherited "for the purposes of this will" held insufficient to show that the testator
intended to exclude them from receiving an intestate share). For a discussion of the proper
treatment of the problem of ambiguous wills, see infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
6o See, e.g., Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 36, at 538 (courts have implied future
interests "where a 'gap' in the disposition was left by the draftsman"). For detailed discus-
sions of the situations in which implied gifts have been found, see 2 L. SimEs & A. SMrrH,
THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 841-844, 1032-1033 (2d ed. 1956); Browder, Trusts and
the Doctrine of Estates, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1531-76 (1974).
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to receive Blackacre. In this situation, some courts have refused to
infer a remainder to A's children because, "though this may have
been the intention of the testator, he did not express it, and the
court has no right to make a will for him. 61 Most courts faced
with such a gap in the testamentary scheme, however, have found
an implied gift to A's children in the event that A should die with
children.6 2 This result has been justified on the ground that, in
most cases, the use of this language reflects T's desire that A's chil-
dren receive Blackacre6 Under this approach, the court considers
what the testator probably intended to accomplish and then recog-
nizes a gift by implication where one is necessary to fulfill this in-
tent. While the implication of a gift cannot be based on mere spec-
ulation, it need not be the only possible interpretation of the
testamentary scheme; 4 if it were the only one, it would be express,
not implied.
In the context of negative wills, finding an implied gift to the
testator's other heirs also serves to implement the testator's proba-
ble intent.6 5 It is usually clear that the testator wanted the ex-
6, 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 60, § 842, at 327; see also, e.g., Bond v. Moore, 236
Ill. 576, 589, 86 N.E. 386, 391 (1908); Hunter v. Miller, 109 Neb. 219, 224, 190 N.W. 583, 586
(1922).
02 See, e.g., In re Blake's Estate, 157 Cal. 448, 471-72, 108 P. 287, 297 (1910); Bishop v.
Bishop, 257 N.Y. 40, 50, 177 N.E. 302, 304 (1931); 2 L. Simss & A. SMITH, supra note 60,
§ 842, at 327-31.
"' See, e.g., 2 L. SmxMs & A. SMITH, supra note 60, § 842, at 327; Langbein & Waggoner,
supra note 36, at 538.
" See, e.g., Shea v. Lyons, 47 Ill. App. 2d 187, 191, 198 N.E.2d 151, 154 (1964) (implica-
tion need not be "absolutely irresistible"); In re Will of Stever, 273 A.D. 344, 347, 78
N.Y.S.2d 47, 51 (1948) (inference of implied gift does not have to 'be irresistible, or such as
to exclude all doubts possible to be raised' ") (quoting In re Will of Vower, 113 N.Y. 569,
571, 21 N.E. 690, 691 (1889)); Willoughby v. Willoughby, 66 R.I. 430, 438, 19 A.2d 857, 861
(1941) (inference of implied gift must be more than "mere speculation" but need not be
"irresistible"); see also 95 C.J.S. Wills § 595, at 784-86 (1957) (implication does not have to
exclude all possible doubt). It has been stated that an implied gift should not be found
unless there is "so strong a Probability of Intention, that an Intention contrary to that,
which is imputed to the Testator, cannot be supposed." Wilkinson v. Adam, 1 V. & B. 422,
466, 35 Eng. Rep. 163, 180 (Ch. 1812); see also, e.g., Hunter v. Miller, 109 Neb. 219, 222, 190
N.W. 583, 585 (1922). In practice, however, courts have not adhered to this exacting stan-
dard. See infra note 65.
05 Most American courts have refused to find implied gifts to a testator's other heirs on
the ground that a negative will "does not give rise to an implication so strong as to leave no
reasonable doubt" that the testator intended his other heirs to receive the excluded heir's
intestate share. In re Estate of Cancik, 121 Ill. App. 3d 113, 117, 459 N.E.2d 296, 299 (1984);
see also, e.g., Estate of Connolly, 65 Wis. 2d 440, 452, 222 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1974). Although
the implied-gift doctrine is commonly formulated in these terms, see supra note 64, courts
usually infer gifts from the testator's dispositive plan where the implied gift is the most
probable interpretation of the testamentary scheme. See, e.g., In re Estate of Spencer, 232
N.W.2d 491, 498 (Iowa 1975) (court used implied-gift doctrine to cure default in exercise of
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cluded heir to receive only the devise in the will or nothing at all;
the testator has simply failed to provide for an alternative disposi-
tion of the estate in the event of the failure of a devise. In such
situations, English courts have assumed that the testator probably
would have wanted his other heirs, not the excluded heir, to re-
ceive the property that passes by intestacy."' Although this as-
sumption may sometimes be inaccurate (for example, the testator
may not have cared who received his property so long as the ex-
cluded heir receives nothing), it most closely approximates what
most testators would have wanted had they foreseen this contin-
gency.67 Thus, where a testator clearly intended to exclude an heir
in his will and some of the estate passes by intestacy, the testator's
intent is best fulfilled by implying a gift of the excluded heir's in-
testate share to the testator's other heirs.
Courts following the American rule have recognized properly
that, under a less restrictive rule, a gift to a testator's other heirs
might be inferred where the testator's intent to exclude an heir is
ambiguous.6 8 This creates a danger that the testator's actual intent
might be frustrated.6 9 Adopting a per se rule that negative wills
special power of appointment); Cretecos v. Lucia, 335 Mass. 678, 679-80, 141 N.E.2d 833,
834 (1957) (where testator had given beneficiary a house but not the land underneath it,
court found gift by implication of right to sufficient use of the land to make the house
habitable); see also supra text accompanying notes 60-63 (courts usually imply gift over to
A's children where will devises "life estate to A, and if A dies without children, remainder to
B"). Moreover, the implied-gift doctrine, as formulated by English courts, is very similar to
the formulation of the doctrine in American courts, compare 95 C.J.S. Wills § 595, at 784
(1957) ("[Tlhe probability of an intention to make the devise or bequest implied must ap-
pear from the will to be so strong that an intention to the contrary cannot reasonably be
supposed to have existed in the testator's mind.") (footnote omitted), with 1 C. SHERRIN, R
BARLOW & R. WALLINGTON, WILLIAMS' LAW RELATING TO WILLS 740 (5th ed. 1980) (implied-
gift doctrine "is based, not on a necessity, but on so strong a probability of intention to
benefit the persons in question that a contrary intention cannot be supposed") (footnote
omitted), and English courts have had little difficulty in finding the inference raised by a
negative will to be sufficient to imply a gift to the testator's other heirs, see supra note 19
and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., In re Wynn, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 237, 240-42 (Ch. 1983).
7 In a negative will case, a testator has expressed an intent that a certain heir should
receive only what was devised in the will, and the award of an intestate share to that heir
would defeat his intent. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Although testators gen-
erally do not consider the possibility that some of their property might pass by intestacy
where they have made a will, see 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 1, § 30.15, at 109
(where "testator has attempted to dispose of all his property. . . [he no doubt] thinks that
he has accomplished this purpose"), it is probable that the maker of a negative will would
have wanted any intestate property to go to his other heirs, not the heir that he specifically
excluded, had he considered this possibility.
" See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
9 For example, the testator may simply have intended to express a preference for the
beneficiaries in the will over the excluded heir. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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cannot prevent an heir from receiving his share of any intestate
property, 0 however, is an unnecessarily restrictive response.7 1 The
evidentiary concern can be satisfactorily addressed, without frus-
trating the testator's intent in clear cases, by placing the burden of
proof" on the proponent of the will (the heir who will benefit if
another heir is excluded) .' Extrinsic evidence of the testator's in-
tent at the time the will was executed might also be admitted to
resolve any ambiguity about the testator's intent to exclude an
heir. 4
He may not have intended that the heir be excluded in favor of other heirs who are not
beneficiaries in the will.
70 See supra text accompanying note 22.
71 In many cases, the testator's intent to limit an heir to the devise (if any) in the will is
clear. See, e.g., Nagle v. Conard, 79 N.J. Eq. 124, 134, 81 A. 841, 846 (Ch. 1911) (negative
will not enforced even though it provided that heir is not to receive more than the devise in
the will "under any circumstances"), affd, 80 N.J. Eq. 252, 86 A. 1103 (1912); Condry v.
Coffey, 163 Tenn. 508, 511, 43 S.W.2d 928, 930 (1931) (negative will not valid even though it
specified that a certain devise is "all that I intend [the heir] to have out of my estate at any
time"). The overinclusive nature of the American rule is most apparent in cases where a
testator drafts an instrument that simply provides for the disinheritance of a certain heir
and does not contain an affirmative disposition of his estate. In this situation, although the
only possible interpretation of the testator's intent is that the heir is to be excluded in favor
of his other heirs, the American rule still requires the award of an intestate share to the
excluded heir. See, e.g., In re Hefner's Will, 122 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253-54 (Sur. Ct. 1953) (refus-
ing to enforce negative will that made no affirmative disposition); Coffman v. Coffman, 85
Va. 459, 466, 8 S.E. 672, 675 (1888) (same).
71 This comment uses the term "burden of proof" to refer to both the initial "burden of
production" and the "burden of persuasion." For a discussion of the distinction between
these two concepts, see EDWARD CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (3d ed. 1984).
71 In cases where the will provides simply that a certain heir is to receive a small devise
or that the heir is disinherited "only for the purposes of this will," see supra note 59, the
proponents of the will (the testator's other heirs) will not be able to show that the testator
would have wanted them to receive the intestate property to the exclusion of the heir whose
share was limited. Because testators generally do not consider the possibility that their will
might fail to dispose of all their property, see supra note 67, it is probable that the testa-
tor's limitation of the gift to one heir was intended merely to express a preference for other
beneficiaries of the will.
7' Although there will usually be no extrinsic evidence available on the issue of whether
the testator would have wanted his other heirs, not the excluded heir, to receive any intes-
tate property, cf. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 36, at 539 (in cases involving implied
future interests, testators usually have not considered what should be done to fill a gap in
their testamentary scheme), extrinsic evidence may be helpful in establishing whether the
testator intended to limit an heir to what was devised in the will. Where there is an ambigu-
ity in the will, extrinsic evidence at the time of the execution of the will should be admissi-
ble to cure this ambiguity. See, e.g., R. WELLMAN, L. WAGGONER & 0. BROWDER, supra note
35, at 383; 9 JOHN WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
§§ 2470-2472 (3d ed. 1940); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 36, at 530 & n.28. In a juris-
diction that holds a strong presumption against the admission of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret the terms of a will, the enforcement of negative wills may justifiably be denied on this
ground. Such a rule should not, however, be used to deny the validity of negative wills in
cases where the testator's intent is unambiguous.
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Application of the implied-gift doctrine would also satisfy the
other objections to negative wills that underlie the American rule. 5
First, a negative will can now be seen as affirmatively disposing of
a decedent's property: the exclusion of an heir constitutes a gift by
implication of that heir's intestate share to the testator's other
heirs. This renders inapplicable the rule that all property not af-
firmatively disposed of by will must pass according to the intestacy
statute. Second, courts are not forced to speculate about who
should receive the testator's property because the order of distri-
bution is provided by the intestacy statute: the excluded heir is
treated as having predeceased the testator, and the testator's other
heirs receive what would otherwise have gone to the excluded
heir.7 6 Finally, the claim that it is undesirable to "mix" the probate
and intestacy systems77 is satisfied because all of the estate passes
under the will; the negative will is no more objectionable on this
ground than a will that expressly incorporates the intestacy
statute.8
The use of the implied-gift doctrine in negative will cases will
not unduly burden probate courts. Most testators who want to ex-
clude heirs would not rely solely on this doctrine: in order to fore-
close possible litigation over such issues as whether the testator
intended to prevent an heir from receiving his share of any intes-
tate property by excluding him in the Will, their lawyers will con-
tinue to put residuary clauses in wills. 79 The primary beneficiaries
of this rule would be unsuspecting testators who, acting without
expert legal advice, draft negative wills thinking that they will bar
certain heirs from receiving more than the devise (if any) in the
will.80 Thus, this rule would serve to promote the implementation
of the testator's intent and would require courts to engage in an
inquiry into that intent in only a small class of cases.81 Moreover,
' See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Will of Beu, 70 Misc. 2d 396, 399, 333 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861 (Sur. Ct.
1972), aff'd, 44 A.D.2d 774, 354 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1974).
1 For a criticism of this argument, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
79 Cf. Langbein, supra note 35, at 524 (arguing that expert draftsmen will not rely on a
proposed substantial-compliance doctrine because "they opt for maximum formality, in or-
der to be in the best possible position to defend the will against any claim of imposition or
want of finality").
80 Cf. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession,
97 HARv. L. RE V. 1108, 1135 (1984) ("[N]ot every client is represented by counsel, much less
good counsel, nor do clients inevitably act promptly in accordance with counsel's advice.").
"I A more restrictive rule would be easier to administer (if the court was willing to
accept the harsh results it would produce), but only at the cost of defeating the testator's
intent-the very purpose that the law of wills is intended to promote. See supra notes 35-
[52:177
Negative Wills
application of the implied-gift doctrine may in fact decrease litiga-
tion. By confining the issue to whether the testator's intent was
clear, either on the face of the will or with the admission of extrin-
sic evidence, the results of litigation should be more predictable:
there will no longer be any need for escape valves from the Ameri-
can rule-such as creative "construction" of the terms of a
will -that are often arbitrarily or inconsistently applied.
CONCLUSION
Historically, many of the rules of the law of wills have been
traps for uninformed draftsmen.83 Such rules have been disappear-
ing recently because of a growing awareness that they complicate
the law of succession without serving any legitimate policy. 4 The
American rule that an heir excluded in a negative will must never-
theless be awarded his share of any intestate property should also
be discarded because it defeats the testator's intent and furthers
no important policy of the law of wills. It should be replaced by
the English rule that the express exclusion of an heir in a will con-
stitutes a valid implied gift of his intestate share to the testator's
other heirs. This approach best effectuates the testator's intent be-
cause a testator who has used a negative will would probably have
wanted his other heirs, not the heir excluded in his will, to receive
the property that passes by intestacy.
J. Andrew Heaton
36, 38 and accompanying text.
82 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
83 If, for example, a testator signed at the beginning of his will instead of at the end, his
will would be invalid. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, supra note 6, § 75, at 360 & n.33.
84 See, e.g., Kossow, Probate Law and the Uniform Code: "One for the Money..." 61
GEo. L.J. 1357, 1369-81 (1973) (discussing the recent relaxation of Wills Act formalities).
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